Tahoon API - Security Audit¶
Executive Summary¶
The Tahoon API demonstrates a strong security-first approach with multiple layers of protection. However, several critical vulnerabilities and security gaps were identified that require immediate attention.
Overall Security Rating: ⚠️ B+ (Good with Critical Gaps)
Key Strengths:
- Multi-layered security architecture
- Strong encryption implementation (AES-256)
- Request integrity validation (HMAC-SHA256)
- ID obfuscation for all sensitive identifiers
- Multi-tenant isolation
Critical Vulnerabilities:
- 🔴 Exception details exposed to clients
- 🔴 Hardcoded secrets in configuration files
- 🔴 No rate limiting
- 🔴 Missing audit logging
- 🟡 Weak password hashing (SHA-256 without salt)
Table of Contents¶
- Authentication & Authorization Security
- Data Protection
- Input Validation
- Cryptography
- API Security
- Database Security
- Third-Party Integration Security
- Configuration Security
- Vulnerability Assessment
- Compliance & Privacy
- Security Recommendations
1. Authentication & Authorization Security¶
1.1 JWT Token Security¶
Status: ✅ Generally Secure with Gaps
Strengths¶
✅ HMAC-SHA256 Signing: Strong algorithm
✅ Token Expiration: 24-hour lifetime
✅ Issuer/Audience Validation: Prevents token reuse across services
✅ Custom Claims: OrganizationId isolation
Vulnerabilities¶
🔴 CRITICAL: Hardcoded JWT Secret
// appsettings.json (COMMITTED TO REPOSITORY)
{
"Jwt": {
"Key": "7955BF0A-8507-4214-B494-8B2B5F1BF150"
}
}
Impact: If repository is exposed, attackers can:
- Generate valid tokens for any organization
- Impersonate legitimate organizations
- Access all tenant data
Severity: CRITICAL
Recommendation:
- Move to Azure Key Vault or environment variables
- Rotate secret immediately
- Use at least 256-bit random key (current is UUID, only 128-bit)
🔴 CRITICAL: No Token Refresh Mechanism
Issue: Tokens expire after 24 hours, requiring full re-authentication
Security Risk:
- Credentials transmitted more frequently
- Higher attack surface window
Recommendation:
- Implement refresh token flow
- Use short-lived access tokens (15 minutes) + long-lived refresh tokens
🟡 MEDIUM: No Token Revocation
Issue: Compromised tokens cannot be invalidated before expiry
Code Location: No blacklist or revocation mechanism exists
Recommendation:
- Implement token blacklist (Redis cache)
- Add /api/auth/revoke endpoint
- Check blacklist in JWT validation middleware
1.2 Organization Authentication¶
Status: ✅ Secure
Code: AuthController.GetToken()
// Validates grant_type
if (request.GrantType != "password")
return Unauthorized();
// Database lookup by access key
var response = _authRepository.Authenticate(request.AccessKey);
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(response?.SharedAPIKey))
return Unauthorized();
✅ Strengths:
- Database-backed validation
- No direct SQL injection risk (stored procedure)
- Returns minimal information on failure
⚠️ Weakness: No brute-force protection
Recommendation: Add rate limiting to token endpoint
1.3 Authorization Enforcement¶
Status: ⚠️ Partially Secure
Multi-Tenant Isolation¶
✅ Good: Organization ID extracted from JWT
string? organizationId = User.FindFirst("OrganizationId")?.Value;
✅ Good: User ownership validation
var validateUser = await _userRepository.ValidateOrganizationUserId(
userId, organizationId);
Gaps¶
🟡 MEDIUM: Missing Role-Based Access Control
Issue: All organizations have identical permissions
Scenario: Cannot distinguish between:
- Read-only integrations
- Full-access integrations
- Administrative access
Recommendation:
- Add Role claim to JWT (Admin, ReadWrite, ReadOnly)
- Implement policy-based authorization
- Enforce at controller level
2. Data Protection¶
2.1 ID Encryption¶
Status: ✅ Well Implemented
Algorithm: AES-256-CBC + Base64URL
Code: SecurityHelper.EncryptId(), EncryptedModelBinder
✅ Strengths:
- All sensitive IDs encrypted in transit
- Automatic decryption via model binding
- URL-safe encoding
- Prevents sequential ID guessing
Encryption Flow:
PlainID (12345)
↓
AES-256-CBC Encrypt
↓
Base64 Encode
↓
URL-Safe Transform (+ → -, / → _, remove =)
↓
Encrypted: "Kx3mF-2pL_9qR"
Minor Issues¶
🟡 LOW: Weak Iteration Count
Code: Cryptography class
private int _iterations = 2; // ❌ Too low
Recommendation: Use at least 10,000 iterations (OWASP recommendation: 310,000 for PBKDF2-SHA256)
🟡 LOW: SHA1 in Key Derivation
Code:
var key = new Rfc2898DeriveBytes(passPhrase, saltBytes, _iterations,
HashAlgorithmName.SHA1); // ❌ SHA1 deprecated
Recommendation: Use HashAlgorithmName.SHA256
2.2 Connection String Encryption¶
Status: ✅ Secure Approach, ⚠️ Implementation Gaps
Code: BaseRepository.DecryptConnectionString()
✅ Strengths:
- Credentials encrypted at rest
- Decrypted only in memory
- Per-component encryption
🔴 CRITICAL: Encryption Keys in appsettings.json
{
"SecuritySettings": {
"AESKey": "pH2uJjFtaE4n+Kk3QfCNrX4lZkZcPbqP5gVZAp1o0P8=",
"AESIV": "q6JxgUuToRnQmTnOKGh3Nw==",
"PassPhrase": "55C9F5A8-17B8-4783-ABB1-D9AC7C3CF9BB",
"Salt": "2GlHRj2MxxxC2Dnn",
"Vector": "8WhO95QaRasSxsfh",
"EncryptionPassword": "Password*1"
}
}
Impact: If config file exposed:
- Database credentials can be decrypted
- All encrypted data compromised
- ID encryption broken
Recommendation:
- Move keys to Azure Key Vault
- Use managed identities for database access
- Rotate keys quarterly
2.3 Password Hashing¶
Status: ⚠️ Weak Implementation
Code: SecurityHelper.GeneratePassword()
public string GeneratePassword(string password)
{
using (var sha256 = SHA256.Create())
{
byte[] bytes = Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(password);
byte[] hash = sha256.ComputeHash(bytes);
return Convert.ToBase64String(hash);
}
}
🔴 CRITICAL Issues:
1. No Salt: Vulnerable to rainbow table attacks
2. No Iterations: Fast hashing enables brute-force
3. SHA-256: Not designed for password hashing
Modern Alternative:
// Use Argon2id or bcrypt
using var argon2 = new Argon2id(Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(password))
{
Salt = GenerateRandomSalt(16),
DegreeOfParallelism = 8,
Iterations = 4,
MemorySize = 65536
};
return Convert.ToBase64String(argon2.GetBytes(32));
Note: This may not be actively used in Tahoon API (for main Psyter API)
Recommendation:
- Implement Argon2id or bcrypt
- Add per-user salt
- Use at least 10 iterations
3. Input Validation¶
3.1 Anti-XSS Protection¶
Status: ✅ Good Coverage
Implementation: ValidateAntiXSSAttribute, AntiXssAttribute
Detection Pattern:
var xssPattern = @"(?i)<\s*\/?\s*(script|iframe|embed|object|form|style|link|meta|img|svg|marquee|input|button|base|body|video|audio|source|frame|frameset|ilayer|layer|bgsound|title|xml|plaintext|xss)[^>]*>|
(on\w+)\s*=\s*(['""]).*?\2|
javascript:|data:text\/html|vbscript:|mocha:|livescript:";
✅ Strengths:
- Comprehensive pattern coverage
- Blocks script tags, event handlers, dangerous protocols
- Applied globally via [ValidateAntiXSS] attribute
⚠️ Weaknesses:
🟡 MEDIUM: Regex Bypass Risk
Issue: Complex regex patterns can be bypassed with encoding/obfuscation
Example Bypass Attempts:
- <script> → <scr<script>ipt>
- javascript: → java\nscript:
- Event handlers: on error=
Recommendation:
- Use HTML sanitization library (HtmlSanitizer)
- Encode output (defense in depth)
- Content Security Policy (CSP) headers
🟡 MEDIUM: AllowHTML Mode
Code: AntiXssAllowHTMLAttribute
// Only checks for specific dangerous attributes
Regex r = new Regex(@"(?:formaction|background|lowsrc|ping|on\w+=)",
RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);
Risk: More permissive, potential bypass
Recommendation:
- Use whitelist approach (only allow specific safe tags)
- Sanitize instead of validate
3.2 SQL Injection Protection¶
Status: ✅ Secure
Approach: Stored procedures only (no inline SQL)
Code Example: AuthRepository.Authenticate()
using var cmd = CreateDbCommand("Organization_Authenticate_ByApplicationToken", conn);
cmd.Parameters.AddWithValue("@ApplicationToken", appToken);
✅ Strengths:
- Parameterized queries (via stored procedures)
- No string concatenation for SQL
- Database-level input validation
No vulnerabilities detected
3.3 Request Integrity Validation¶
Status: ✅ Excellent
Implementation: ValidateSecureHashAttribute
Algorithm: HMAC-SHA256 using SharedAPIKey
Code:
private string GenerateSecureHash(string data, string key)
{
using (var hmac = new HMACSHA256(Convert.FromBase64String(key)))
{
var hash = hmac.ComputeHash(Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(data));
return Convert.ToBase64String(hash);
}
}
✅ Strengths:
- Cryptographically secure (HMAC-SHA256)
- Per-organization secret (SharedAPIKey)
- Prevents request tampering
- Property-level inclusion control
No vulnerabilities detected
3.4 Model Validation¶
Status: ⚠️ Basic
Approach: ASP.NET Core model validation
✅ Good: Required fields validated
if (!ModelState.IsValid)
{
return StatusCode(400, new BaseResponse { ... });
}
🟡 MEDIUM: Insufficient Validation
Missing Validations:
- Email format validation
- Phone number format validation
- Date range validation (DOB in future?)
- String length limits
- Enum value validation
Example Code Issue: UserController.SubmitUserAssessmentQuestions()
if (request?.ScreeningResult == null || request.UserScreeningAnswers.Any(a =>
a.CatScreeningQuetionOptionId == null && a.AnswerText == null))
{
// Only checks for null, not content validity
}
Recommendation:
- Add [StringLength], [Range], [EmailAddress] attributes
- Implement custom validators
- Use FluentValidation library
4. Cryptography¶
4.1 Encryption Algorithms¶
Status: ✅ Modern Algorithms, ⚠️ Weak Configuration
Implementation Summary:
| Algorithm | Purpose | Status |
|---|---|---|
| AES-256-CBC | ID encryption, connection strings | ✅ Strong |
| HMAC-SHA256 | Request integrity (SecureHash) | ✅ Strong |
| SHA-256 | Password hashing | ❌ Weak (no salt) |
| PBKDF2-SHA1 | Key derivation | ⚠️ Outdated |
| JWT HMAC-SHA256 | Token signing | ✅ Strong |
4.2 Key Management¶
Status: 🔴 CRITICAL - Poor Practices
🔴 CRITICAL: Hardcoded Secrets
Files with hardcoded secrets:
1. appsettings.json - JWT key, AES key, IV, PassPhrase, Salt, Vector
2. firebase-adminsdk-live.json - Firebase private key (likely committed)
Impact: Full system compromise if repository exposed
Example:
{
"Jwt": {
"Key": "7955BF0A-8507-4214-B494-8B2B5F1BF150" // ❌ Hardcoded
},
"SecuritySettings": {
"AESKey": "pH2uJjFtaE4n+Kk3QfCNrX4lZkZcPbqP5gVZAp1o0P8=", // ❌ Hardcoded
"AESIV": "q6JxgUuToRnQmTnOKGh3Nw==", // ❌ Hardcoded
"PassPhrase": "55C9F5A8-17B8-4783-ABB1-D9AC7C3CF9BB", // ❌ Hardcoded
"Salt": "2GlHRj2MxxxC2Dnn", // ❌ Hardcoded
"Vector": "8WhO95QaRasSxsfh" // ❌ Hardcoded
}
}
Recommendation:
# .gitignore additions
appsettings.json
appsettings.*.json
firebase-adminsdk*.json
# Use environment variables or Azure Key Vault
export SecuritySettings__AESKey="..."
export SecuritySettings__AESIV="..."
🔴 CRITICAL: Static IV Reuse
Code: Same IV used for all AES operations
aes.IV = Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(_settings.AESIV); // ❌ Static IV
Vulnerability: CBC mode with static IV allows pattern detection
Impact: Identical plaintexts produce identical ciphertexts
Recommendation:
- Generate random IV for each encryption
- Prepend IV to ciphertext
- Extract IV during decryption
4.3 Cryptographic Randomness¶
Status: ⚠️ Not Verified
Issue: No code found generating random values (salts, IVs, tokens)
Recommendation: Ensure use of RandomNumberGenerator (not Random)
// ❌ Weak
var random = new Random();
var salt = random.Next();
// ✅ Cryptographically secure
using var rng = RandomNumberGenerator.Create();
var salt = new byte[16];
rng.GetBytes(salt);
5. API Security¶
5.1 Rate Limiting¶
Status: 🔴 CRITICAL - Not Implemented
Code: No rate limiting middleware found
Vulnerability:
- DDoS attacks
- Brute-force attacks on token endpoint
- Resource exhaustion
Attack Scenarios:
1. Token Endpoint Brute-Force:
POST /api/auth/token (repeated 1000x/sec)
→ Guess access_key
- Provider Search Spam:
POST /api/careprovider/getcareproviderslistwithschedule → Overload database
Recommendation:
// Install: AspNetCoreRateLimit
builder.Services.AddMemoryCache();
builder.Services.Configure<IpRateLimitOptions>(options =>
{
options.GeneralRules = new List<RateLimitRule>
{
new RateLimitRule
{
Endpoint = "POST:/api/auth/token",
Limit = 5,
Period = "1m"
},
new RateLimitRule
{
Endpoint = "*",
Limit = 100,
Period = "1m"
}
};
});
Priority: CRITICAL - Implement Immediately
5.2 CORS Configuration¶
Status: ❓ Not Found in Code
Issue: No CORS policy detected
Risk:
- If missing: APIs may not work from web browsers
- If too permissive: CSRF attacks
Recommendation:
builder.Services.AddCors(options =>
{
options.AddPolicy("TahoonAPI", policy =>
{
policy.WithOrigins("https://trusted-partner.com")
.AllowAnyMethod()
.AllowAnyHeader()
.AllowCredentials();
});
});
5.3 HTTPS Enforcement¶
Status: ✅ Configured
Code: app.UseHttpsRedirection();
✅ Good: HTTPS redirect enabled
🟡 Recommendation: Add HSTS header
app.UseHsts(); // HTTP Strict Transport Security
5.4 API Documentation Security¶
Status: ⚠️ Swagger Enabled in Production
Code: Program.cs
if (app.Environment.IsDevelopment())
{
app.UseSwagger();
app.UseSwaggerUI();
}
else
{
app.UseSwagger(); // ⚠️ Enabled in production
app.UseSwaggerUI(c => { ... });
}
Risk: Information disclosure (API structure, parameters)
Recommendation:
- Disable Swagger in production
- OR require authentication for Swagger UI
- OR use separate URL with IP restrictions
5.5 Error Handling & Information Disclosure¶
Status: 🔴 CRITICAL - Vulnerable
🔴 CRITICAL: Exception Details Exposed
Code: Multiple controllers
catch (Exception ex)
{
return StatusCode(StatusCodes.Status500InternalServerError, ex);
// ❌ Full exception object returned to client
}
Example Leaked Information:
- Stack traces (reveals file paths, method names)
- Database errors (table names, schema)
- Third-party API errors (credentials, endpoints)
Production Output Example:
{
"ClassName": "System.Data.SqlClient.SqlException",
"Message": "Invalid object name 'UserLoginInfo'.",
"Data": null,
"InnerException": null,
"HelpURL": null,
"StackTraceString": " at System.Data.SqlClient.SqlConnection.OnError...",
"RemoteStackTraceString": null,
"Source": "System.Data.SqlClient",
"HResult": -2146232060
}
Fix:
catch (Exception ex)
{
_logger.LogError(ex, "Error in BookSession"); // Server-side only
return StatusCode(500, new BaseResponse
{
Status = 0,
Reason = ResponseReason.Error,
Message = "An error occurred while processing your request." // ✅ Generic
});
}
Priority: CRITICAL - Fix Immediately
5.6 Security Headers¶
Status: ❓ Not Implemented
Missing Headers:
- X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
- X-Frame-Options: DENY
- X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
- Content-Security-Policy
- Referrer-Policy: no-referrer
Recommendation:
app.Use(async (context, next) =>
{
context.Response.Headers.Add("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff");
context.Response.Headers.Add("X-Frame-Options", "DENY");
context.Response.Headers.Add("X-XSS-Protection", "1; mode=block");
context.Response.Headers.Add("Referrer-Policy", "no-referrer");
await next();
});
6. Database Security¶
6.1 Connection Security¶
Status: ✅ Encrypted Credentials, ⚠️ Configuration Issues
✅ Strengths:
- Connection strings encrypted at rest
- SQL Server authentication (not Windows auth)
- Parameterized queries via stored procedures
🟡 MEDIUM: Connection String in Memory
Issue: Decrypted connection string stored in memory
Recommendation:
- Use managed identities (Azure SQL)
- Avoid storing connection strings altogether
6.2 Least Privilege¶
Status: ❓ Cannot Verify
Unknown: Database user permissions
Recommendation Checklist:
- [ ] Database user should NOT have db_owner role
- [ ] Grant EXECUTE on specific stored procedures only
- [ ] No SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE on tables
- [ ] Separate users for different services
6.3 SQL Injection¶
Status: ✅ Protected
Analysis: All database calls use stored procedures with parameters
No vulnerabilities detected
7. Third-Party Integration Security¶
7.1 VideoSDK Integration¶
Status: ⚠️ Secure Communication, Configuration Issues
API Calls: VideoSDKHelper.CreateMeetingAsync()
✅ Strengths:
- HTTPS communication
- JWT authentication
- Token expiration (24 hours)
🟡 MEDIUM: Credentials in Database
Code: Loads from CatAppConfigSetting table
VIDEOSDK_API_KEY = sdkAPIKey.PropertyValue; // ⚠️ Plaintext in DB
VIDEOSDK_SECRET_KEY = sdkSecretKey.PropertyValue; // ⚠️ Plaintext in DB
Recommendation:
- Encrypt sensitive config in database
- Or use Azure Key Vault references
7.2 Firebase Cloud Messaging¶
Status: ⚠️ Service Account Key Management
🟡 MEDIUM: Service Account JSON File
Files:
- firebase-adminsdk-live.json
- firebase-adminsdk.json
Risk: If committed to repository, Firebase project compromised
Verification Needed:
# Check if in version control
git log --all --full-history -- "*firebase-adminsdk*.json"
Recommendation:
- Add to .gitignore
- Rotate service account keys if exposed
- Use environment variable with JSON content
- Or use Firebase Admin SDK with Application Default Credentials
8. Configuration Security¶
8.1 Sensitive Data in Configuration¶
Status: 🔴 CRITICAL - Multiple Issues
Hardcoded Secrets Found:
| Secret Type | Location | Risk Level |
|---|---|---|
| JWT Signing Key | appsettings.json |
🔴 Critical |
| AES Encryption Key | appsettings.json |
🔴 Critical |
| AES IV | appsettings.json |
🔴 Critical |
| Encryption PassPhrase | appsettings.json |
🔴 Critical |
| Salt/Vector | appsettings.json |
🔴 Critical |
| DB Connection Strings | appsettings.json |
🔴 Critical |
| Firebase Service Account | .json files |
🟡 High |
Immediate Actions:
1. Remove secrets from repository
2. Invalidate all exposed credentials
3. Implement secure secret management
8.2 Environment-Specific Configuration¶
Status: ⚠️ Partial
Files:
- appsettings.json (Production)
- appsettings.Development.json (Development)
🟡 MEDIUM: Production Secrets in Repository
Issue: Both files likely in version control
Recommendation:
# Add to .gitignore
appsettings.json
appsettings.*.json
!appsettings.example.json
# Keep template only
appsettings.example.json
9. Vulnerability Assessment¶
9.1 OWASP Top 10 (2021) Analysis¶
| Risk | Status | Findings |
|---|---|---|
| A01: Broken Access Control | ⚠️ Medium Risk | - No RBAC - Multi-tenant isolation good |
| A02: Cryptographic Failures | 🔴 Critical | - Hardcoded keys - Static IV - Weak password hashing |
| A03: Injection | ✅ Low Risk | - Protected via stored procedures |
| A04: Insecure Design | ⚠️ Medium Risk | - No rate limiting - No token revocation |
| A05: Security Misconfiguration | 🔴 Critical | - Swagger in production - Exception exposure - Missing security headers |
| A06: Vulnerable Components | ✅ Low Risk | - .NET 8.0 (current) - Updated NuGet packages |
| A07: Auth Failures | ⚠️ Medium Risk | - No MFA - No brute-force protection |
| A08: Data Integrity Failures | ✅ Low Risk | - SecureHash validation good |
| A09: Logging Failures | 🔴 Critical | - No audit logging - No security event logging |
| A10: SSRF | ✅ Low Risk | - Limited external calls |
9.2 Penetration Testing Scenarios¶
Recommended Tests:
-
Token Brute-Force
# Test rate limiting for i in {1..1000}; do curl -X POST https://api/auth/token -d "access_key=test$i" done -
SQL Injection Attempts
# Test stored procedure protection curl -X POST https://api/user/register \ -d '{"name":"admin'--","dob":"1990-01-01"}' -
XSS Payloads
curl -X POST https://api/user/register \ -d '{"name":"<script>alert(1)</script>","dob":"1990-01-01"}' -
ID Enumeration
# Test if encrypted IDs can be predicted for id in {1..1000}; do curl https://api/careprovider/profile/$id done -
Exception Information Disclosure
# Trigger errors to leak stack traces curl -X POST https://api/sessionbooking/booksession \ -d '{"invalidfield":"test"}'
10. Compliance & Privacy¶
10.1 GDPR Compliance¶
Status: ⚠️ Gaps Identified
Data Subject Rights:
| Right | Implementation Status |
|---|---|
| Right to Access | ❓ Not verified |
| Right to Rectification | ❓ Not verified |
| Right to Erasure | ❌ No endpoint found |
| Right to Data Portability | ❌ Not implemented |
| Right to Object | ❌ Not implemented |
Concerns:
- No user data export endpoint
- No account deletion endpoint
- Unclear data retention policies
10.2 HIPAA Compliance (Healthcare Data)¶
Status: ⚠️ Additional Controls Needed
Requirements:
| Control | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Encryption at Rest | ⚠️ Partial | DB encryption not verified |
| Encryption in Transit | ✅ Yes | HTTPS enforced |
| Access Logging | ❌ No | No audit trail |
| Minimum Necessary | ✅ Yes | Multi-tenant isolation |
| User Authentication | ✅ Yes | JWT authentication |
| Automatic Logoff | ❌ No | No session timeout |
| Audit Controls | ❌ No | Missing |
Gaps:
- No audit logging for PHI access
- No data retention/destruction policies visible
- No backup encryption verification
10.3 PCI DSS (if handling payments)¶
Status: ❓ Payment handling unclear
Code Analysis: Payment references found but implementation unclear
Concerns:
- OrderMain table has payment fields
- Refund logic exists
- No PCI-compliant payment gateway integration visible
Recommendation: If handling payments:
- Use PCI-compliant payment gateway (Stripe, etc.)
- Never store credit card numbers
- Implement tokenization
11. Security Recommendations¶
11.1 Critical (Do Now - Within 1 Week)¶
| Priority | Issue | Recommendation | Effort |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🔴 P0 | Exception details exposed | Implement global exception handler, generic error messages | 4h |
| 🔴 P0 | Hardcoded secrets in config | Move to Azure Key Vault, rotate all secrets | 8h |
| 🔴 P0 | No rate limiting | Implement AspNetCoreRateLimit | 4h |
| 🔴 P0 | Static IV reuse | Generate random IV per encryption | 8h |
| 🔴 P0 | Weak password hashing | Implement Argon2id or bcrypt | 6h |
Estimated Total Effort: 30 hours (1 sprint)
11.2 High Priority (Do Next - Within 1 Month)¶
| Priority | Issue | Recommendation | Effort |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🟡 P1 | No audit logging | Implement Serilog with structured logging | 8h |
| 🟡 P1 | No token refresh | Implement refresh token endpoint | 8h |
| 🟡 P1 | No token revocation | Implement token blacklist (Redis) | 6h |
| 🟡 P1 | Missing security headers | Add security headers middleware | 2h |
| 🟡 P1 | Swagger in production | Disable or add authentication | 2h |
| 🟡 P1 | Firebase keys in repo | Move to secure storage, rotate keys | 4h |
| 🟡 P1 | Weak PBKDF2 iterations | Increase to 310,000 iterations | 2h |
Estimated Total Effort: 32 hours
11.3 Medium Priority (Plan - Within 3 Months)¶
| Priority | Issue | Recommendation | Effort |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🟢 P2 | No RBAC | Implement role-based authorization | 16h |
| 🟢 P2 | No CORS policy | Define and implement CORS | 4h |
| 🟢 P2 | Model validation gaps | Add comprehensive validation | 8h |
| 🟢 P2 | Database credential management | Use managed identities | 8h |
| 🟢 P2 | GDPR compliance gaps | Implement data export/deletion | 16h |
| 🟢 P2 | Security testing | Penetration testing & SAST tools | 16h |
Estimated Total Effort: 68 hours
11.4 Security Development Lifecycle¶
Recommendations:
-
Pre-Commit:
- Add git hooks to detect secrets (e.g.,detect-secrets)
- Run SAST scanner (SonarQube, Snyk) -
CI/CD Pipeline:
- Dependency vulnerability scanning
- SAST/DAST automated tests
- Secrets scanning -
Code Review:
- Security-focused code review checklist
- Peer review all crypto changes -
Regular Activities:
- Quarterly security audits
- Monthly dependency updates
- Annual penetration testing
12. Security Checklist¶
12.1 Immediate Actions (This Week)¶
- Remove hardcoded secrets from
appsettings.json - Add
appsettings*.jsonto.gitignore - Rotate JWT signing key
- Rotate encryption keys (AES key, IV, PassPhrase)
- Implement generic error messages (hide exceptions)
- Add rate limiting to
/api/auth/token - Disable Swagger in production OR add authentication
- Review Firebase service account key exposure
12.2 Short-Term Actions (This Month)¶
- Implement global exception handler
- Add security headers middleware
- Implement audit logging (Serilog)
- Add token refresh endpoint
- Implement token blacklist
- Fix static IV issue (generate random IV)
- Increase PBKDF2 iterations to 310,000
- Switch PBKDF2 from SHA1 to SHA256
- Implement Argon2id for password hashing
- Add comprehensive model validation
12.3 Medium-Term Actions (Next Quarter)¶
- Implement role-based authorization
- Add CORS policy
- Migrate secrets to Azure Key Vault
- Implement managed identities for SQL
- Add GDPR data export endpoint
- Add account deletion endpoint
- Conduct penetration testing
- Implement SAST/DAST in CI/CD
- Add security monitoring (Application Insights)
- Document security architecture
13. Conclusion¶
The Tahoon API demonstrates a strong security foundation with multi-layered protection, but suffers from critical configuration and operational security gaps that require immediate attention.
Security Maturity Level: Level 2 (Basic Security) out of 5
Path to Level 3 (Managed Security):
1. Fix critical vulnerabilities (hardcoded secrets, exception exposure)
2. Implement audit logging and monitoring
3. Add rate limiting and DDoS protection
4. Establish security testing in CI/CD
Overall Assessment:
- ✅ Well-Designed Security Architecture
- ⚠️ Configuration Security Needs Improvement
- 🔴 Operational Security Gaps Critical
- ✅ Code-Level Security Generally Good
Primary Risk: Hardcoded secrets in configuration files - If repository is exposed or credentials leak, entire system is compromised.
Recommended Action: Immediately rotate all secrets and implement Azure Key Vault before deploying to production or sharing repository access.